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I. INTRODUCTION
In Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment,1 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that a suit may not be brought against the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) on the basis
of any employee relations.' This ruling was derived from the court's
interpretation of the provisions of the International Organizational Im-
munities Act (IOIA), 3 the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)4
1. Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492
(D.D.C. 1990).
2. Id. at 494.
3. 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288i (1988).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
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and the World Bank's Articles of Agreement.' The court ultimately
decided to construe narrowly the IBRD's waiver of immunity6 and to
define broadly discretionary activity.7
This Note initially examines the district court's reasoning in
reaching its conclusion. The effect of the court's decision in Morgan
was to allow suit only under conditions that the founders of the IBRD
might have intended.8 As a result, fundamental rights of individuals
have been compromised in favor of the expansion of global economic
interests. This Note further explores the history of the international
immunity doctrine and suggests how that doctrine influenced the
court's decision. In addition, this Note examines the recent trend in
international law towards the recognition of human rights. Finally, this
Note proposes an alternative to the court's reasoning 9 that will achieve
greater harmony between individual rights and societal goals.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Charles Morgan, an employee of a temporary employment agency,
worked for two and one half years in a secretarial position at the
IBRD.' 0 Morgan alleged that in 1989, IBRD officials and security
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter Articles of
Agreement].
6. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
7. See id. at 495.
8. See id. at 494.
9. As explained, infra, the court based its decision on economic rationales, entirely
disregarding human rights issues.
10. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 493. The IBRD is an international organization
whose goals involve aiding the commercial development of its member nations, enhanc-
ing foreign investment, and promoting international trade. Articles of Agreement,
supra note 5, 60 Stat. at 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. at 134. The organization is comprised of
nations who participate in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which invests capi-
tal in debtor countries experiencing payment problems. Id. art. II, § 1, 60 Stat. at
1441, 2 U.N.T.S. at 135. The IMF was created subsequent to World War II to en-
courage growth and eliminate policies that were contrary to trade. Its ultimate purpose
was to make funds available to indebted countries. Each member nation contributes an
amount relative to its position in the world economy.
The United States has been involved in the IBRD since receiving Congressional
authorization in 1945. See 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1988). The other countries which origi-
nally joined to form this agreement were: Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India,
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guards "forcibly detained [him] against his will and denied him access
to an attorney."" They accused him of stealing money, yet presented
no evidence. 12 Subsequently, they made "unwarranted threats in the
course of continuing harassment.""3 Morgan sought compensatory and
punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, libel and slander. 4 In its defense, the IBRD contended
that the actions of its employees were internal activities, subject to the
broad protection of sovereign immunity."6
B. Issues and Holding
The first issue addressed by the district court was whether the
waiver of immunity in article VII, section 3 of the IBRD's Articles of
Agreement should be read broadly to allow recovery for employee
grievances.' 6 In addition, the court questioned whether Morgan's
claims fell within the "commercial activity" exception to immunity
pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' 7 It also addressed
the issue of whether the conduct of the IBRD officials and agents could
be considered "discretionary functions" under the FSIA, which would
also exempt the IBRD from suit. 18
In response to these issues, the district court ruled that article VII,
section 3 of the IBRD's Articles of Agreement must be read narrowly
to cover only the activity necessary for the IBRD to perform its func-
tions. 19 Employee suits were not found to be such an activity. The
"commercial activity" exception was found to pertain only to the
Iran, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, the U.S.S.R., the
United Kingdom, Iceland, the United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. Articles of Agreement, supra, 60 Stat. at 1462-65, 2 U.N.T.S. at 154-56.
11. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 493.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Sovereign immunity, as fully explained, infra, is a doctrine that holds gov-
ernmental entities non-liable for various types of conduct in foreign jurisdictions.
16. id. at 494; see also Articles of Agreement, art. VII, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1457-58,
2 U.N.T.S. at 180.
17. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988). The district
court in Morgan explained that it is not clear whether international organizations may
be deemed "states" within the meaning of the FSIA, but decided to consider the IBRD
as such for the purpose of its ruling. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
18. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 495; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1988).
19. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
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IBRD's external operations.20 Finally, the court determined that the
"discretionary function" exemption from suit applies when the alleged
wrongful conduct is the exercise of a policy judgment. 1 The decision to
detain and question Morgan was, according to the court, a policy judg-
ment.22 Therefore, the court concluded that the IBRD was immune
from suit. 3
This finding by the district court is the most recent in a long line
of rulings that have expanded immunity for international organiza-
tions,2 ' thereby devaluing fundamental human rights. The following
analysis of this trend illustrates the basis for the court's decision. Al-
though precedent supports the holding in Morgan, this Note suggests
that an increased emphasis on international human rights may produce
a better result in future cases, one that vindicates, rather than deni-
grates, human rights.
III. LEGAL CONTEXT: BROAD IMMUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of diplomacy that limits the lia-
bility of governmental entities or officials for their wrongful conduct in
foreign jurisdictions. The doctrine is recognized in the courts of every
nation. 5 Sovereign immunity was founded during a period when the
sensitivities of domestic rulers were deemed more important than any
infringement upon the laws of nations in which they visited.2" Failure
to respect a foreign ruler in one's own jurisdiction was perceived as
hostility toward that ruler and his native country.27 To avoid offending
20. See id.
21. Id. at 495.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Mendaro v. World
Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
25. See Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE
L.J. 1148, 1148 (1954) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunity].
26. See Draft Convention of the Competence of Courts ir Regard to Foreign
States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 451 (Supp. 1932) (hereinafter Competence of Courts).
The absolute power of each sovereign was derived from the common law notion that
the "king can do no wrong." The foundation of this concept came from the Roman
view of an imperial ruler. See also John Sanborn, The Immunity of Merchant Vessels
when Owned by Foreign Governments, 1 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 5, 5 (1926).
27. According to one source:
In such a period, influenced by the survival of the principle of feudalism, the
exercise of authority on the part of one sovereign over another inevitably indi-
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a visiting dignitary, the local sovereign rendered the foreign leader ab-
solutely immune from the laws of the local forum.28 As a result, many
leaders in foreign territories were granted privileges that frequently led
to abuse.2 9 They could act in a harmful manner towards the residents
of the locality with no fear of legal repercussions. Ultimately, national
interests in avoiding the offense of foreign dignitaries were elevated
above the rights of individual citizens."0
Modern courts continue to recognize absolute immunity."1 How-
ever, with the rise of a global economy, a restrictive variation of immu-
nity has been established by acts of Congress. 2 Like absolute immu-
nity, restrictive immunity prevents national courts from asserting
jurisdiction over a foreign government with respect to the exercise of its
sovereign capacity. 3  More importantly, however, this emerging doc-
trine withholds immunity from a foreign government carrying out com-
mercial activities, such as trade or investment.3 ' In the words of one
court, "[t]he restrictive immunity doctrine is designed to accommodate
the legal interests of citizens doing business with foreign governments
cated either the superiority of overlordship or the active hostility of an equal.
The peaceful intercourse of States could be predicated only on the basis of
respect for other sovereigns.
Competence of Courts, supra note 26, at 527.
28. See Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 25, at 1149.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The cases of Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752
F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1990), Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27
(D.C. Cir. 1980), and Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983), are all
examples in which absolute immunity was affirmed.
32. An example of this restrictive form of immunity is expressed in the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunity Act which allows for international organizations to
waive their immunity under certain circumstances. See 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1988)
and infra text accompanying notes 42-48, for further explanation regarding the Inter-
national Organizations Immunity Act as it pertains to restrictive immunity.
33. See Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23
INT'L LAW. 187, 191 (1989).
34. Id. In essence, restrictive immunity distinguishes between diplomatic acts,
which are immune from suit, and commercial acts, which are not immune. As the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit instructed in Broadbent v. Or-
ganization of Am. States:
The central feature of restrictive immunity is the distinction between the gov-
ernmental or sovereign activities of a state (acts jure imperii) and its com-
mercial activities (acts jure gestionis). Foreign states may not be found liable
for their governmental activities by American courts; but they enjoy no
immunity from liability for their commercial activities.
Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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on the one hand, with the interests of foreign states in avoiding the
embarrassment of defending the propriety of political acts before a for-
eign court.""6
In Morgan, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia first analyzed the IBRD's liability under the IOIA which
provides for absolute immunity. The court found that absent waiver,
international organizations are "absolutely immune from suits arising
out of their internal operations."36 In addition, the district court em-
ployed a restrictive immunity analysis in determining that Morgan's
claims did not fall within a "commercial activity" exception. 37 Finally,
the district court focused on a comparison between the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to con-
clude that international organizations are immune from suit when exer-
cising discretionary functions . 8
A. Waiver of Immunity Under the IOIA
The International Organizations Immunity Act codifies absolute
immunity for international organizations.3 9 The Act grants immunity
to organizations that 1) are specified by the President as entitled to
provisions of the Act; and 2) are engaged with the United States pursu-
ant tO a treaty or congressional act. 40 The immunities of such organiza-
tions are enumerated in section 288(a) of the International Organiza-
tions Immunity Act:
International organizations, their property and their assets,
wherever located, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the
same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as
is enjoyed by foreign governments, except, to the extent that
such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.'
Consistent with this waiver provision of the IOIA, article VII, sec-
tion 3 of the IBRD's Articles of Agreement details the conditions under
35. Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 33.
36. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 493.
37. Id. at 494.
38. Id. at 495.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 288-288i (1988).
40. The World Bank meets these two requirements through specification by Exec.
Order No. 9751, 3 C.F.R. 558 (1943-1948 Comp.), and through Congressional ap-
proval of United States participation, 22 U.S.C. §§ 286, 286h (1988).
41. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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which suit may be brought.4" While the text of article VII implies a
waiver of immunity,43 the breadth of its application is unclear. The
provision states: "Actions may be brought against the IBRD only in a
court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which
the IBRD has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of ac-
cepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securi-
ties."" The phrase "[aictions may be brought" indicates an intent by
the IBRD to face the consequences of its actions.48 However, it is un-
certain whether this language is potent enough to constitute an explicit
waiver of immunity under the 1OIA.
In Mendaro v. World Bank,'46 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit found that the language of article VII, sec-
tion 3 does not waive the immunity from suit which the IBRD other-
wise receives under the 1OIA. 7 This action centered on Susan
Mendaro's allegation that during her employment with the IBRD she
was a victim of continuous sexual harassment and discrimination by
other IBRD employees. 48 Despite the seriousness of Mendaro's claim,
the court decided that she did not have a cause of action against the
IBRD:
[W]e are unable to read the somewhat clumsy and unartfully
drafted language of Article VII section 3 . . . as evincing an
intent by the members of the Bank to establish a blanket
waiver of immunity from every type of suit not expressly pro-
hibited by reservations in Article VII section 3. The interpreta-
tion urged by Mendaro is logical only if the waiver provisions
are read in a vacuum, without reference to the interrelationship
between the functions of the Bank set forth in the Articles of
Agreement and the underlying purposes of international
immunities."9
Thus, the court narrowly construed section 3 and found the IBRD's
members could only have planned to waive immunity from actions by
42. Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. VII, § 3, 60 Stat. at 1457-58, 2
U.N.T.S. at 180.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1457.
45. Id.
46. 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 612.
49. Id. at 614-15.
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its debtors, creditors, bondholders, and other potential plaintiffs to
whom the IBRD would have had to subject itself in order to realize its
goals of development and reconstruction." Clearly, complete immunity
for all IBRD actions would dissuade these external entities from invest-
ing with the IBRD; the ultimate risk of transacting with an agency
that is entirely unaccountable for its actions is generally too great for
any business entity to undertake.
For this reason, the court determined whether the necessary "in-
tent to waive" existed by analyzing how the IBRD might best fulfill its
purpose of inspiring investment for the reconstruction and development
of member nations. 5 1 Immunity would only be granted for bank opera-
tions that would assist in the realization of these aims.52 A waiver of
immunity for employee suits was deemed to be "not necessary" for the
Bank to "perform its functions.""3 Since the waiver of immunity could
"severely hamper its worldwide operations" '5 4 the court concluded that
immunity was preserved by the "members' failure expressly to waive
it."'5 5 Thus, the court made no attempt to achieve a proper balance
50. Id. at 615; see also infra note 51.
51. The primary functions of the IBRD are:
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members
by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the
restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of
productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the devel-
opment of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.
(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or partici-
pation in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when
private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private in-
vestment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes
out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.
(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and
the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging inter-
national investment for the development of the productive resources of mem-
bers, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and con-
ditions of labor in their territories.
(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international
loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects,
large and small alike, will be dealt with first.
Articles of Agreement, supra, note 5, at art. I, 60 Stat. at 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. at 134.
52. Id.
53. Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492,
494 (D.D.C. 1990) (quoting Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
54. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615-17. See also infra notes 113-22 and accompanying
text for explanation on how the IBRD's worldwide operations would be hampered.
55. Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1., 60 Stat. at 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. at
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between economics and the human rights issues of discrimination and
sexual harassment; its scales tilted entirely in favor of the IBRD'S fi-
nancial interests. The district court in Morgan followed the Mendaro
court's narrow interpretation of the waiver, and proceeded to consider
other exceptions to the Bank's immunity.
B. Commercial Activity Exception Under the FSIA
The "commercial activity" exception is applicable if the IBRD or
any other international institution has restrictive as opposed to absolute
immunity." The applicable United States law governing this exception
is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.5 7 Section 1602 of the Act
provides that "[ujnder international law, states are not immune from
the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities
are concerned."" Section 1605(a) of the FSIA included "commercial
activity" in its list of general exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity
of a foreign state:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity car-
ried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.5 9
The Act defines "commercial activity" as:
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular com-
mercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an ac-
tivity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
by reference to its purpose.60
56. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 494.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
58. Id.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ap-
plied a very narrow construction of this exception in Gibbons v. Repub-
lic of Ireland,6 holding that under the FSIA "immunity remains the
rule rather than the exception." '62 Consistent with this broad conception
of immunity and narrow construction of the exception, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit court has consistently re-
jected "commercial activity" arguments.63
In Broadbent v. Organization of American States,6" the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit justified such a construc-
tion by declaring that it is the "'essentially commercial nature of an
activity that is critical."65 Indeed, the court found that the "nature" of
employment in international civil service is not "commercial," but is
"public or governmental." 66 The court rationalized this conclusion by
interpreting the OAS' function as not to accrue profits, but to pursue
diplomatic ends. 61 To achieve this aim "[i]nternational officials should
be free as possible ... to perform their duties free from the peculiari-
ties of national politics."'68
Moreover, the court argued that "[d]enial of immunity opens the
door to divided decisions of the courts of different member states pass-
ing judgment on the rules, regulations, and decisions of international
bodies." 69 According to the court, this "undercutting of uniformity"
has the negative effect of "undermin[ing] the ability of the organiza-
tion to function effectively."17 0 Thus, the court decided that the nature
of the relationship between an international organization and its inter-
nal administrative staff is noncommercial.7 1 Relying on the Broadbent
rationale, the Morgan court rejected the commercial activity argument,
and proceeded to analyze the application of immunity under the
61. 532 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D.D.C. 1982).
62. Id.
63. See Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 33-36 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
64. 628 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 35.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 35. The court further ruled that "absent waiver, activities defining or
arising out of that relationship may not be the basis of an action against the organiza-
tion-regardless of whether international organizations enjoy absolute or restrictive im-
munity." Id.
MORGAN v. INTERNATIONAL BANK
FSIA. 2
C. Tort Exception under the FSIA
Generally, there is no immunity for foreign states who are respon-
sible for causing tortious injury to a citizen of the jurisdiction they are
visiting.73 However, when such harm results from the conduct of an
official exercising discretionary authority, immunity is preserved.
74
Therefore, immunity for tortious activity under the FSIA depends on
whether conduct of the international officials can be deemed "discre-
tionary. 75 Section 1605(a)(5)(A) of the FSIA states that the excep-
tion to immunity for "any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment" does not
attach to "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether
the discretion be abused. 76
The Morgan court looked to District of Columbia Circuit prece-
dent for guidance in interpreting this discretionary function exception
of the FSIA. In MacArthur Area Citizens Association v. Republic of
Peru,7 it was held that the exception should be "narrowly construed"
so as not to encompass the farthest reaches of common law. 78 In order
to give the exception a narrow construction, MacArthur broadly de-
fined "discretionary" as encompassing all fundamentally governmental
activities. 9 For these reasons, it has been decided that acts of a govern-
mental nature constitute discretionary activity for the purpose of sub-
section (A).10
The Morgan court further looked to interpretations of an analo-
gous discretionary function provision in the Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA) as a model for construction of the FSIA provisions.8" Section
2680(a) of the FTCA provides that liability shall not attach to "[a]ny
72. See Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., 752 F. Supp.
492, 494 (D.D.C. 1990).
73. MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 919 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (citing Gibbons v. Republic of.Ir., 532 F. Supp. 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
74. Id. at 921-23.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a.)(5)(A) (1988).
76. Id.
77. 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
78. Id. at 921.
79. Id. (citing Olsen v. Government of Mex., 729 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 17 (1984)).
80. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 645.
81. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 495 (citing MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Re-
public of Peru, 809 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."82 The Supreme Court has interpreted
section 2680(a) of the FTCA as preserving immunity for "decisions
grounded in social, economic and political policy."83 This exception was
created to prevent "judicial intervention in policymaking" under the
guise of adjudication of tort disputes.84 In addition, the Court has con-
cluded that conduct, rather than the actor's status, governs whether the
discretionary function exception applies.8 5 Therefore, whether conduct
of a foreign official can render his or her government or organization
liable depends not "upon whether the actor functioned at an opera-
tional or planning level, but instead on whether the decisions he made
were 'grounded in social, economic, and political policy.' 9986
Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has expressed that the discretionary function exception shields
not only the acts initiating discretionary activities but also the decisions
made as to the implementation of those activities .8 Thus, implement-
ing acts by definition involves the exercise of policy judgment.8
Applying these principles of the FTCA set out by the Supreme
Court and the court of appeals, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit interpreted the analogous provision of the FSIA in a
recent case.8 9 As a result, the court ruled that the discretionary func-
tion exception has the capability of further immunizing the conduct of
lower level employees who are merely carrying out a policy directive.90
The Morgan court utilized these interpretations to determine that
the "alleged false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress clearly involved the exercise of a policy judgment." 91 The court
concluded that Morgan's supervisor "knew in advance" that Morgan
would be questioned, and that his treatment was "monitored" and
82. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
83. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
84. Id. at 820.
85. Id. at 813.
86. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 800 F.2d 1187 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 814 (1984)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. MacArthur Area Citizens Ass'n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 922-23
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
90. Id.
91. Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp. 492,
495 (D.D.C. 1990).
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"guided" by World Bank "higher-ups. 92 These activities were consid-
ered discretionary because they were deemed decisions to implement
policy directives.9 3 Consequently, the court held that the FSIA's tort
exception "provides no basis for proceeding.
IV. THE REASONING OF MORGAN: ALLOWING DIPLOMACY AND
ADMINISTERABILITY CONCERNS TO OUTWEIGH INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Diplomacy
Underlying the district court's reading of immunity lies the issue
of diplomacy. In Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,95 the Supreme
Court engrafted the concept of sovereign immunity upon American
law. American owners of the sea vessel Schooner Exchange, seized by
Napoleon's armies and converted to a warship for the French, sought to
recover the ship as it rested in the Philadelphia harbor.9 In determin-
ing whether the American owners could sue the French in American
courts to recover their property, the Court decided to exempt foreign
sovereigns from suit in the United States. 97 The Court reasoned that a
contrary finding would "degrade the dignity" of the foreign sovereign.9 8
As a result, the Court extended the traditional immunity over the for-
eign sovereign person to the sovereign's public armed vessels.99
Opportunities to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity have
continually increased in the twentieth century due to the expanded par-
ticipation of governments in private pursuits of investment and the ex-
plosion of international trade through improved technology and re-
sources. 100 However, the growth of unions and civil rights activism in
this century has been contemporaneous with the expansion of the
global market. In the interests of diplomacy, the courts have left the
conflict of these two increasing forces to the foreign policy decisions of
politicians. 10° An early example of this hands-off policy is the Supreme
Court's decision in Mexico v. Hoffman.10 2
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 494.
95. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 116 (1812).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 146.
98. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 141-44.
99. Id.
100. See Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 25, at 1148, 1149.
101. Id.
102. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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In Hoffman, the Court resisted judicial interpretations of immu-
nity by contending, "[iut is therefore not for the courts ... to allow an
immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize."' 03 Such an allowance would "embarrass the political de-
partment in its efforts to secure the national interest, just as would de-
nying immunity contrary to executive policy."'" 4 Thus, a primary ra-
tionale for the continued prominence of sovereign immunity is the
extreme reluctance of tribunals to meddle in foreign affairs. Until the
courts are willing to adopt a more forceful stance, the courts' concerns
for foreign affairs will continue to predominate over individual rights.
B. Administration
To deny a means of redress for a plaintiff who has been forcibly
detained against his will,'" 5 denied access to an attorney, 06 and contin-
ually threatened and harassed0 7 indeed would be a "most serious in-
fringement" of individual rights. 0 8 The Morgan court defends this "in-
fringement" by reasoning that without immunity, the IBRD would
have its employment relations subjected to the laws of each host coun-
try in which it conducted activity. 10 9 Therefore, a denial of immunity
could "severely hamper" the IBRD's "worldwide operations.""10
This rationale is based on the discussions in two related cases:
Mendaro v. World Bank"' and Broadbent v. Organization of Ameri-
can States."2 In Mendaro, the court of appeals instructed that there is
a "strong foundation" in international law for the immunity of interna-
tional organizations." 3 The goal of this immunity is to realize "coordi-
nated international action" through multinational organizations with
specific purposes."14 Immunity in employment suits functions to shield
these organizations from unilateral control by a host member nation." 15
103. Id. at 35.
104. See Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 25, at 1157 (citing Mexico v. Hoff-
man, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945)).
105. Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp.
492, 493 (D.D.C. 1990).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. id.
109. Id. at 494.
110. Id. (quoting Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
111. 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
112. 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
113. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The administrative concerns of monitoring numerous employment prac-
tices in each area would severely burden the goals of an organization if
it were subject to liability in every jurisdiction." 6
In Broadbent, the court of appeals further instructed that the
United States has accepted that an international organization must be
at liberty to pursue its functions and that no member state may act to
harm the organization's objectives.'1 7 In addition, an organization
should be as "free as possible" to execute its responsibilities "free from
the peculiarities" of the local sovereign's laws." 8 The attempt of one
sovereign to hear the claims of international civil employees would en-
snare the courts of that sovereign in the internal administration of
those organizations with whom the employees are employed. 1 9 An ex-
emption from immunity would result in the courts of member states
inconsistently "passing judgment on the rules, regulations, and deci-
sions of the international bodies."' 2 ° A further result would be a serious
"undercutting" of the application of staff regulations.' 2 ' Thus, the abil-
ity of an international institution to "function effectively" would be se-
riously undermined.' 22
The Supreme Court has recognized that international corporations
are often compelled to conform their employment practices to the codes
of each nation in which they have employees. 2 3 However, the Mendaro
court distinguished between private corporations and international or-
116. Id.; see also supra note 51 for the primary purposes of the IBRD.
117. Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 34 (citing XIII Documents of the United Nations
Conference on International Organizations 704-05 (1945), reprinted in 13 WHITMAN
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1968)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 35.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
At first sight, disputes of this sort could be referred to municipal tribunals.
The organization normally possesses immunity, but immunity can be waived.
However, the special nature of the law governing employment in international
organizations, closely linked as it is with delicate questions of administrative
policy, makes municipal tribunals totally unsuited to deal with it .... Courts
in all countries usually refuse to handle questions of foreign public law, and,
in the same way, a number of municipal courts have held themselves incom-
petent to judge claims brought by international civil servants against the or-
ganizations which employ them, not on the grounds of immunity, but on the
grounds of the special law applicable.
Id. (citing M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 12 (1967)).
123. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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ganizations: 24 private corporations are created under the laws of one or
more countries while international organizations are founded by the
"joint action of several states."1 5 The court noted that international
organizations are designed to alleviate problems across national bor-
ders, with each member realizing benefits.12 Consequently, interna-
tional organizations owe their ultimate loyalty to the guidelines of their
own documents and not to the laws of any particular member state.
27
The court of appeals turned to the IBRD's Articles of Agreement
to illustrate how judicial scrutiny of IBRD internal administrative af-
fairs would obstruct the organization's goals. 2 8 In article III, section
5(b) the IBRD is directed to "ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted ... without
regard to political or other non-economic influences .... " Further,
in article V, section 5(c) it is mandated that the IBRD, its officers, and
staff "owe their duty entirely to the [IBRD] and to no other author-
ity."' 30 The officers of the IBRD are prohibited from disrupting the
political activities of its members,'13 and its members are not allowed
to influence the political activities of the officers.' 32
The court of appeals interpreted these sections as limiting excep-
tions to immunity to the IBRD's external commercial activities. 33 It
stated that the only permissible exceptions are those that serve primar-
ily to "enhance the marketability" of IBRD securities and the "credi-
bility of its activities" in the lending market. 34 According to its Arti-
cles of Agreement, the IBRD is empowered "[t]o guarantee securities
in which it has invested for the purpose of facilitating their sale."'
3 5
The court of appeals explained that this "guarantee" would have mini-
mal impact if beneficiaries of the guarantee were bereft of the ability to
124. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 619.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 620.
129. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. III, § 5(b), 60 Stat. at 1444, 2
U.N.T.S. at 146.
130. Id., art. V, § 5(c), 60 Stat. at 1452, 2 U.N.T.S. at 152.
131. Id., art. IV, § 10, 60 Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 150.
132. Id., art. V, § 5(c), 60 Stat. at 1452, 2 U.N.T.S. at 152.
133. Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
134. Id. at 618 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 84, Reporters' Note at 275 (1965)).
135. Articles of Agreement, supra note 5, art. IV, § 8(ii), 60 Stat. at 1449, 2
U.N.T.S. at 134.
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sue to enforce the IBRD's obligations."3 6
Therefore an external, as opposed to an internal, restriction of im-
munity would hamper the IBRD's ability to conduct the ordinary activ-
ities of a financial institution in the commercial marketplace.137 Fur-
thermore, if immunity for commercial transactions were not waived,
the IBRD could purchase office supplies only on a cash basis.' 38 The
every day employment of utilities and telephones would be "placed on
other than usual commercial terms."139
In addition to administrative problems, the Mendaro court indi-
cated that liability for internal activities could pose a detriment to the
IBRD's infrastructure. 4 This structure requires the IBRD to remain
"independent from the intranational policies of its individual mem-
bers." 1 4 ' As a result, many charters of international organizations like
the IBRD guarantee neutral operation. 42 To address injustice that
might occur to an individual employee of one of these international or-
ganizations, most of these institutions have established internal admin-
istrative tribunals.1 43 These tribunals have exclusive authority to deal
with employee grievances. 44 However, as discussed in the following
section, the tribunals are often ill-equipped to handle such cases, leav-
ing the individual employee with no effective means of redress.
V. A BETTER SOLUTION: STRIKING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE
BETWEEN THE NEEDS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
As one commentator has argued in regard to sovereign immunity:
"the plaintiff deserves a day in court."" 45 In the past decade the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has heard an increasing number of cases in
136. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618. The court of appeals further explained:
Potential investors would be much less likely to acquire the Bank's own secur-
ities if they could not sue the Bank to enforce its liabilities. Similarly, the
commercial reliability of the Bank's direct loans and private loan guarantees
would be significantly vitiated if its debtors and beneficiaries were required to
accept the Bank's obligations without recourse to judicial process.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 616.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Michael Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in
Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 613 (1954).
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which there were serious allegations of infringement of individual
rights on the part of international organizations. From false imprison-
ment 4" to improper discharge 147 and sexual discrimination,148 these
institutions have exceeded the limits of diplomacy. On each occasion
the District of Columbia Circuit has been presented with an opportu-
nity to vindicate the rights of these injured individuals, but has instead
exaggerated administrative and foreign policy concerns to avoid reach-
ing a conclusion that could lead to'international friction. 149
This hands-off policy is no longer acceptable. The time has come
for these organizations to assume responsibility for their tortious ac-
tions, particularly in the employment context.
A. Actual Effect on Diplomacy
No country wants to be subject to another nation's laws; the antic-
ipation of having the tables turned upon itself is what discourages a
sovereign from requiring others to conform to its laws. In reality, how-
ever, under principles of international law, a host sovereign is free to
subject another sovereign to its jurisdiction so long as the host sover-
eign gives notice of its desire to pursue such a policy. 5 ' Clearly, to
some extent the District of Columbia Circuit is reluctant to correct the
abuses effected by many international organizations out of a fear of
offending foreign sovereigns. *When dealing with an international or-
ganization, however, this concern is mitigated. International organiza-
tions are comprised of officials from many nations. Thus, the major risk
of international friction is avoided, as there is no possibility for one
nation to affect the power or degrade the dignity of another nation.
Further, it has been argued that "judicial remedies against foreign
states may enhance, rather than impede, international friendship."' 5
People able to satisfy their claims might perhaps gain a more favorable
impression of other nations. This improvement to diplomacy is
thwarted when citizens become frustrated by the absence of a forum in
which to bring their claims."5 2
146. See Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp.
492 (D.D.C. 1990).
147. See Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
148. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
149. Id.
150. See Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 1 6, 146 (1812).
151. Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 25, at 1170.
152. Id.
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B. Fostering the Administration of International Suits
Barring immunity in cases arising from employee complaints has
the potential to "relieve diplomacy of the burden of attempting to settle
many cases which the judiciary can handle more economically and
more justly."' 3 The courts are arguably more competent to resolve dis-
putes than are administrative tribunals established by the international
organizations. The IBRD created such a tribunal to hear employment
contract disputes.154 This tribunal, however, is vested with only limited
retroactive jurisdiction. 55 Many classifications of individual rights are
beyond the parameters of tribunal jurisdiction. In Mendaro, for exam-
ple, the administrative tribunal was not explicitly authorized to hear
Susana Mendaro's claims of sexual harassment and discrimination.1 56
The Mendaro court gives no explanation for why these actions are ex-
cluded. The court merely contends that the tribunal has limited author-
ity and jurisdiction to hear employee claims, and that "employee dis-
satisfaction with the efficacy of the administrative remedy is insufficient
to dissolve the immunity of the international organization." 57
The disallowance of recovery in the tort cases that arise from the
policies of many international organizations is particularly unfair when
contrasted with the remedies available to an individual who has con-
tracted with one of these organizations. The contracting individual does
so at his or her own will and can protect against breach by obtaining
security. But the circumstance is altogether different when an individ-
ual is tortiously harmed by an international entity. This individual has
not incurred the risk voluntarily, and can not protect himself or herself
adequately.' 58 Without an independent tribunal in which to vindicate
rights, the rights of people like Charles Morgan will continue to be
abused.' 59 In response to this problem, the doctrine of human rights has
153. Id. It is desirable for judicial controversies with foreign governments that the
opposing party should be subjected to the ruling of the nation who has jurisdiction. It is
undesirable that such claims be settled through diplomatic channels. Id. at 1170-71
n.129 (citing Jasper Y. Brinton, Suits Against Foreign States, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 50,
62 (1931)).
154. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610, 616 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 25, at 1164.
159. The increasing dilemma is that without the administrative tribunals the
plaintiff's opportunity for any recovery is remote: "The injured party's alternative pros-
pects for recovery against an unwilling sovereign defendant are indeed dim. Diplomatic
adjustment of his claim is slow and uncertain. And suit against the foreign government
in its own courts, if permitted, 'would probably necessitate expenses incommensurate
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increased in importance.
C. The Significance of the Human Rights Doctrine
Worldwide attention to human rights has begun to alter the legal
community's perceptions of international law. Traditionally, interna-
tional law was concerned only with the "relation between the states." 160
The rights of individuals did not adhere to the individuals themselves,
but to the nations of their citizenship. 61 The average person was
viewed as an object, rather than a citizen entitled to the rights and
protection of the laws. 62 Gradually, states have begun to acknowledge
that people are the subjects of international law-to recognize that in-
dividuals are no longer mere objects of the state. 63 As a result, states
are beginning to protect individual fundamental freedoms against
abuses by international organizations.' 64
Examples of this trend can be found in the developments in treaty
and customary international law. 165 Treaty law expressly protects
human rights in the individual rights sections of the United Nations
with the prospective recovery.'" Id. (citing Bernard Fensterwaid, Jr., Sovereign Immu-
nity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614, 622-23,(1950)).
160. John P. Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human Rights
Law, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 31, 33 (1978).
161. Id.
162. As one commentator explains:
In international law, subjects is the term used to describe those elements
bearing, without the need for municipal intervention, rights and responsibili-
ties. Under the rules of international law there is no evidence that individuals
are permitted to be the bearers of duties and responsibilities. They must,
therefore, be objects; they are like "boundaries" or "rivers" or "territory" or
any other chapter headings found in traditional textbooks.
Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11, 13 (1978).
163. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
164. It has been instructed that:
Human rights law is said to have developed in the aftermath of the Second
World War. It embodies the notions that individuals have some rights in their
societies, which the state should respect, and that a state's treatment of its
own nationals is not only a matter of its own concern, but is a proper subject
of international concern. The United Nations Charter is a reflection and
source of this concern. It contains, as a goal, the promotion of respect for and
observance of human rights.
Daniel T. Murphy, The Restatement (Third)'s Human Rights Provisions: Nothing
New, But Very Welcome, 24 INT'L LAW. 917, 920-21 (1990).
165. See Humphrey, supra note 160, at 31-32.
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Charter,16 6 the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,16 7 and the two United Nations
Covenants on Human Rights.168 These treaties can become customary
law, and thus bind non-parties whose adherence to the agreements con-
stitutes a "general and consistent practice" followed out of sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris).1 6 9 Customary law is generally binding
on all states.1 70 The law governing aliens is one area in which human
rights law has become customary.7 In this area, a conventional mini-
mum objective standard has been supplanted by a modern standard in
which foreigners and nationals are entitled to equal treatment.
1 72
Encouraged by the human rights development in alienage doctrine,
there has been a call in the international field for a move away from
international law to a more encompassing "world law."'1 3 World law
formalizes codes of proper conduct and obtains its identity from the
international community or indirectly through treaties. 174 It is con-
cerned mainly with member states, but has the added ability of confer-
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 3; art. 13, 1(b); art. 55(c); art. 62, 2; art. 68; art.
76(c).
167. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
168. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) & cmts. b, c (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
170. See Humphrey, supra note 160, at 32.
171. Id. For a complete analysis on the rise of the alienage doctrine, see McDou-
gal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individ-
ual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900 (1974).
172. Humphrey, supra note 160, at 32. Humphrey explains that under the tradi-
tional minimum objective standard, only an alien's state of citizenship had a right of
redress for treatment the alien sustained in violation of international law. Id. at 33
(citing I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 467-82 (2d ed.
1973)).
173. Id.
174. Id. Humphrey also suggests:
[I]t is a moot question hotly debated .. .whether world law is of the same
kind of essence as municipal or national law and in particular whether the
rules of world law must provide penalties or sanctions in the event of contrary
result. It is obvious, however, that law which is not enforced or implemented
or for which there are no provisions for enforcement or implementation can
have little if any practical meaning; such law whatever its source would be for
all practical intents and purposes little more than international morality, im-
portant as that might be.
Id. (citation omitted).
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ring benefits upon individuals.175 Recently, the "world law" concept has
been recognized officially by way of inclusion in the human rights sec-
tions of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States.176
D. The Impact of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States
The Restatement (Third) has three principal sections that advance
the valuation of human rights. 17 7 Section 701 deals specifically with an
international institution's obligation to respect human rights. It main-
tains that a state must respect the rights of individuals subject to its
jurisdiction, including those: (a) that the state has undertaken to re-
spect by international agreement; (b) that states generally are bound to
respect as a matter of customary international law; and (c) that the
state is required to respect under general principles of law common to
the major legal systems of the world. 178
The obligations imposed by section 701 are supported further by
section 702, which establishes the customary international law relating
to human rights. Under section 702, a state contravenes international
law if,
as a matter of policy, it practices, encourages or condones: (a)
genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing
the disappearance of individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, in-
human, or degrading treatment or punishment; (e) prolonged or
arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; or (g)
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights.1 79
These provisions have been considered a possible breakthrough for
individual liberties. One commentator has declared that "[tiheir inclu-
175. Id.
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, §§ 701-703.
177. Murphy, supra note 164, at 917. Murphy further suggests:
[I]t is important to appreciate that the human rights provisions of the Re-
statement (Third) are statements of principles of international law as they
would be applied by the United States and other nation states and interna-
tional organizations. They are not restatements of the domestic laws of the
United States in the narrower sense.
Id. at 919 (citation omitted).
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 701.
179. Id. § 702.
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sion is a testament . . . to the heightened consciousness regarding fun-
damental human rights and the necessity for their protection."18 0
Applying the provisions of sections 701 and 702 to the Morgan
case, one can easily envision their potential impact. Provisions (d) and
(e) of section 702 are particularly applicable. According to section
702(d), an international organization is prohibited from practicing, en-
couraging or condoning "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment." '' In Morgan, the IBRD was alleged to
have "threatened" and "harassed" the employee. 8 2 Furthermore, Mor-
gan's arbitrary detention would be a clear violation of section 702(e). 183
The IBRD was also accused of forcibly detaining Morgan against his
will and denying him access to an attorney."8 4 Clearly, if the Restate-
ment (Third) section 702(e) gains force the IBRD will have difficulty
avoiding similar claims by pleading immunity.
A possible escape hatch for international organizations is the ex-
plicit language of section 702. Under this section, there is a violation of
international law only if the institution, as a matter of policy, encour-
ages or practices the tortious behavior. 8 5 The opening segment of sec-
tion 702 requires a high level of state action before the conduct can be
deemed an infringement upon human rights.' The state must practice
and condone the abuse. 87 Thus, it may well prove difficult for a plain-
tiff to establish that an organization such as the IBRD has a "policy"
of forcible detention and harassment.' 88
180. Murphy, supra note 164, at 918. In addition to the two principal human
rights provisions, there is a remedy provision which maintains that:
(1) A state party to an international human rights agreement has, as against
any other state party violating the agreement, the remedies generally availa-
ble for violation of an international agreement, as well as any special remedies
provided by the agreement.
(2) Any state may pursue international remedies against any other state for a
violation of the customary international law of human rights.
(3) An individual victim of a violation of a human rights agreement may
pursue any remedy provided by that agreement or by another applicable in-
ternational agreement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 703.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 702(d).
182. Morgan v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 752 F. Supp.
492, 493 (D.D.C. 1990).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 702(e).
184. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 493.
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 702.
186. See Murphy, supra note 164, at 921.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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In Morgan, however, the court not only deemed the IBRD to be
an entity equivalent to that of a state, but it also found that the IBRD
officials' actions were a matter of policy. 189 It can be forcefully con-
tended that the policy that gained the IBRD officials' immunity in
Morgan is the same type of policy that triggers liability under the Re-
statement (Third). A state must "practice" and "condone" the abuse
for it to be "policy" under the Restatement. 190 Though the Morgan
court found that IBRD officials had indeed engaged in conduct that
practiced and condoned abuses against Mr. Morgan, the court sup-
ported the conduct of the officials because such conduct was in accor-
dance with IBRD policy for such employee disputes. If the IBRD is
found immune from liability for its tortious conduct under the FSIA, it
must also be found liable under the provisions of the Restatement
(Third). Thus, the Restatement has the potential to subordinate admin-
istrative and economic arguments to the ideals of fairness, justice, and
the acceptance of universal human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Morgan, the District Court followed a string of District of Co-
lumbia Circuit cases that clung to the traditional notion of immunity
for international organizations. The rationale behind these rulings was
the belief that institutions, such as the IBRD, are incapable of handling
the burden of liability in the employment setting. The court's position
is that such cases "could severely hamper [the organization's] world-
wide operations."'' As a result, the current stance of the District of
Columbia Circuit is that "employee relations of any kind cannot be the
subject of litigation against the bank."' 192
This policy contrasts with the increasing desire to respect human
rights, exemplified by the formulation of the new Restatement (Third).
This enhanced recognition of human rights militates against a perspec-
tive that denies compensation for tortious harm to individuals. As na-
tions move closer to forming a global economy, the time has come to
view the individual as a subject, rather than an object, of the interna-
tional laws. Only then can we have a global society that is not merely
189. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 495.
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 169, § 702.
191. Morgan, 752 F. Supp. at 492.
192. Id.
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financially successful, but committed to recognizing and protecting the
fundamental rights common to all citizens of the world community.
Daniel Hammerschlag

